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A REMEDY FOR ELECTION OF REMEDIES:
A PROPOSED ACT TO ABOLISH ELECTION
OF REMEDIES
JAY LEo R oTscmLD*
"The doctrine of election of remedies, as heretofore known, is
abolished. A litigant, unless estopped by his conduct, or by a
former adjudication, or by law otherwise prevented, shall not
be foreclosed from a determination of the merits of his cause or
defense. For the purposes of this statute, a former adjudication
shall include any judgment on the merits, on the facts in controversy, irrespective of the form of the action or the relief
obtainable."
The doctrine of election of remedies has long been the subject of
severe and deserved criticism. Mr. Hine's article, published in the
HarvardLaw Review in 1913,1 was a masterly and prophetic presentation of the defects in its reasons and operation, which has been
entirely justified by subsequent judicial experience. His caustic
characterization of this parasitic growth, couched in the metaphor
of gardening technique, will bear repetition:
"The result of this review of the operation and history of the
doctrine may be summed up in this way: The modem rule of
election of remedies is a weed which has recently sprung up in the
garden of the common law, its roots stretching along the surface
of obiter dicta but not reaching the subsoil of principle. The
judicial gardeners, through whose carelessness it has crept in,
should be able to eliminate it, or, at least, to prevent its further
growth."
The difficulty was and is, however, that judicial gardeners do not
weed the fields of the law. Such is not their function. They sow the
seeds of legal doctrine-both those which flower and those which
sour. Once planted, however, all receive similar treatment. Nothing,
except in rare instances, is ever rooted out. Few, indeed, and rare,
are the cases expressly overruling prior erroneous judicial decision.
In the fertile soil of legal reasoning, accelerated and encouraged by
dictum, both judicial and obiter, the weeds of error grow side by side
with the flowers of correct principle, until the weeds crowd out the
flowers, Even when an occasional industrious judicial gardener clears
his patch, he fails to watch carefully for the weed ever cropping out,
or, if he does, it is impossible for him to keep it clear, by reason of the
ill-kept patches with which he is surrounded, and, gradually, his
*Of the New York Bar, New York City, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law
School, St. Lawrence University.
'Hines, Election of Remedies; A Criticism (1913) 26 HARV. L. Rv. 707.
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open space is enclosed, crab grass overruns it, and there is nothing
that can be done, except to plough and turn the soil, and start anew.
To recognize these facts, is not unduly to criticize the instrumentalities of the growth of the law. Such is the nature of the judicial
process, and we would not have it otherwise. Until the seeds have
sprouted and shown their superfoliage, the beneficent growth cannot
be distinguished from the malignant. To root out prematurely is at
too great a risk that the good may go with the bad. Stability is worth
the price of delay and even of discomfort. But when the fact is
ascertained, weeding is not enough. There must be a new start.
Symmetry must be restored.
Such is the present condition of the law, with respect to the doctrine
of election of remedies. The time has come when it is necessary to
plough the ground, turn over the soil and start anew.
We do not propose, in this article, to review the origins of the doctrine of election of remedies, or the logic, or, rather, lack of logic,
supporting_ it. Nor do we propose to contrast the widely varying
rules in the several states, as to what constitutes an election of
remedies; i.e., whether it is the inadvertent choice of remedy resulting
in the ill-omened action, or whether it is persistence in that choice,
after warning fairly given and rashly disregarded. All of that has
been done well and sufficiently, both in judicial opinion and legal
criticism.?
Our purpose is not of exposition, but of evangelical mission.
Scholarship of research has made plain the malady and its consequences. The time has come for a remedy for the election of
remedies.
In order to present that remedy, something of the anatomy of the
subject and its embryological development, must be appreciated. It
is only in the light of recent judicial decisions that the need for a
definite and drastic solution becomes apparent.
Election of remedies has its roots in the supposed operations of
legal logic:
"It is only applicable 'when a choice is exercised between
remedies which proceed upon irreconcilable claims of right'
(American Woolen Co. v. Samuelsohn, 226 N. Y. 6x); 'where
there is, by law, or by contract, a choice between two remedies'
2

There have been many contributions on this subject. Illuminating discussions
of principles and decisions are to be found in KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS, Mr.
Hines' article above referred to, and also, Corbin, Waiver of- Tort and Suit in
Assumpsit (i9io) 19 YALE L. J. 221; Deinard and Deinard, Election of Remedies
(1922) 6 MINN. L. REv. 341, 480. See also Schenck v. State Line Telephone
Co., 238 N. Y. 308, 144 N. E. 592 (1924).
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(Henry v. Herrington, 193 N. Y. 218). One may not both affirm
and disaffirm a contract (Conrow v. Little, i15 N. Y. 387), or take
a benefit under an instrument and repudiate it (Haydock v Coope,
53 N. Y. 68). One may not treat the possessor of his land both as
tenant and as trespasser (Stuyvesant v. Dairs, 9 Paige, 427).
A plaintiff must choose to regard a defendant either as a corporation or a partnership (Clausner v. Head, 110 Wis. 405). In
short, one may not invoke the aid of th6 court upon inconsistent
'
theories. (Crossmanv. UniversalRubber Co., 127 N. Y. 34).1 3
But logical contradiction or inconsistency is not always an election
of remedies. A mistaken remedy is contradictory of the correct
one,-yet, in law, not inconsistent with it. So, one may sue in deceit
and thereafter sue for breach of contract. 4 Indeed, a cause of action
for fraud inducing a contract, may be joined with one for breach of
that contract.5 Yet, causes of action which are constituents of a
possible election of remedies, cannot be joined.' Similarly, an action
for conversion, mistakenly assumed to exist, does not bar a subse7
quent action in contract, involving the same subject matter.
It is aary
of the cases to say, that there is no room for
the operation of the doctrine of election of remedies unless, on the
same evidentiary facts in controversy, unsupplemented by subsequent acts required to afford a particular remedy, there is a choice of
logically inconsistent and, therefore, irreconcilable modes of relief.
A contradiction in the evidentiary facts makes wholly impossible the
risk of an election of remedies.
So, a defrauded vendee, who has actually been defrauded, may sue
at law for deceit, or at law for money had and received, or in equity
for rescission.7a Having made his choice, he is bound by it.7b The
evidentiary facts in all three remedies are identical. True, if the
defrauded vendee would sue at law for money had and received, he
must supplement the facts in controversy by a subsequent tender
of that which he received, and, similarly, if he would sue in equity for
a rescission, he must, in his complaint, allege that he is ready, able
3Quotation from opinion of Andrews, J., in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Childs
CO., 230 N. Y. 285, 130 N. E. 295 (1921).
4
Titus v. Poole, 145 N. Y. 414, 4o N. E. 228 (1895).

France & Canada S. S. Corporation v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.,
229 N. Y. 89, 127 N. E. 893 (1920).
'Hill v. McKane, 71 Misc. 581, 128 N. Y. Supp. 819 (Sup. Ct. 1911); Merry
Realty Co. v. Shamokin & Hollis R. E. Co., 23o N. Y. 316, 13o N. E. 3o6 (1921).

7Independent Electric Lighting Corporation v. M. Brodsky & Co., II8 Misc.
56I, 194 N. Y. Supp. i (Sup. Ct. 1922).

7aGotld v. The Cayuga County National Bank, 86 N. Y. 75 (1881).
7bMoller v. Tuska, 87 N. Y. I65 (188x).
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and willing to return that which he received, but these are subsequent
requirements, peculiar to the remedy and not inherent in the wrong
which requires redress.
On the other hand, if the said vendee was mistaken in charging
that there was fraud, he is not bound by his choice, because the
evidentiary facts supporting the remedies available to him were not
identical, and he may resort to other modes of relief. 7 He has merely
mistaken his remedy.
But the inevitable risk of unerring prevision as to what the court
will say were the facts, is the plaintiff's, and though he must elect
his remedy, at his peril, at the commencement of the action,7 it is not
until the conclusion thereof that he can expect confirmation of the
accuracy of his choice. Defendant, however, may lie in wait for the
announcement of the fatal slip in technique, and may register victory,
under the rules of the game, irrespective of the merits.
It is thus apparent that the logic of the law leads to most illogical
results, if the standard of measurement is the doing of justice. Yet,
it is this supposed logic which underlies the theory of our doctrine of election of remedies.
Terry v. Munger8 is the most striking example of the supposed rule
of logic. A tort had been committed by three individuals, in misappropriating property of the plaintiff. Plaintiff had recovered a
judgment against two of them, in a contract form of action, by the
fiction of waiver of tort. The judgment proved uncollectible. Plaintiff, thereupon, sued the third tortfeasor, but this time in the form of
action known as conversion. He was said to have elected his remedy
and that this was so "not by way of estoppel," 9 but because "the
plaintiff had elected to treat the taking of this property as a sale."' 0
Nor was it material that the case had gone to judgment.
"The proof that an action of that nature had in fact been
commenced would have been just as conclusive upon the plaintiffs upon the question of election. . . as would the judgment
have been. It was not necessary that a judgment should follow
upon the action thus commenced.""
It was thought that plaintiff was maintaining logically contradictory
positions. The discontinuance of the action would have been immaterial.
". .. it was of no consequence . . . whether plaintiffs did
or did not make their choice effective...
When it becomes
71Supra note 4.
8121 N. Y 16i,
OI1bid,

24

7dMatter of Garver, 176 N. Y. 386, 68 N. B. 667 (,903).
N. E. 272 (189o).
Ibid., at 167.
nIbid.
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necessary to choose between inconsistent rights and remedies, the
election will be final, and cannot be reconsidered, even where no
injury has been done by the choice, or would result from setting
it aside."'"
The court concluded:
"And this is not the least upon the principle of equitable estoppel.
It is upon the principle that the plaintiffs, by their own free
choice, decided to sell the property, and, having done so, it necessarily follows that they have no cause of action against defendant
for an alleged conversion of the same property by the same
acts
3
which they had already treated as amounting to a sale."1
Accordingly, the result in Terry v. Munger cannot be justified
under the doctrine of res Judicata. To the application of that doctrine, it would have been an insuperable objection that the parties to
the action under consideration, were not those bound by the previous
judgment.
It was not estoppel, but logic, which supported the rule.
Yet, thirty-four years later, in Schenck v. State Line Telephone Co.,14
the same court said:
"Indeed it is probable that some element either of ratification
or estoppel is at the root of most cases, if not all, in which an
election of remedies, once made, is viewed as a finality."' 5
Accordingly, it was held that a defrauded plaintiff, who had mistakenly sued in deceit, which remedy was barred by the statute of
limitations, might discontinue that action and sue in equity for
rescission. The court said:
"The plaintiff is not charged to have signified a will to ratify
except by signifying a will to sue. - He is not charged to have
evinced a readiness that the transaction should be allowed to
stand except in conjunction with a demand that damages be paid,
and upon the tacit but implied condition that the demand should
be obeyed. The purchasers thwarted the condition. Theynow
attempt to ignore it, as if the will to ratify had been absolute.
The plaintiff said in effect: 'I wish to recover damages and on
that basis to affirm.' The defendants in effect answer: 'Your
right to damages is gone, bit because you have ventured to ask
for them, you forfeit everything else.' We think the nullification
of the condition must draw with it as a consequence the nullification of the choice. The failure of one destroys the significance
of the other as an expression of the will.
We reach the same conclusion if we apply to the abortive choice
the principles by which courts of equity are governed when they
relieve against mistake."' 6
I2 Ibid., at 168. (italics the writer's).
14Supra note 2.
'5 lbid., at 312.

'Irbid., at I69. (italics the writer's).
'lbid., at 313 (italics the writer's).
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The intimation was strong that, in any event, a discontinuance of
the first election was of decisive significance. It was not immaterial
that "Repentance, for all that the pleadings show, followed swiftly
17
upon warning."
The rule of logic finds here no idol worshipper. Logically applied,
the effect of this argument would entirely destroy the doctrine of
election of remedies. The affinnance of any contract would, in fact,
be disproved by the theory expressed, of "conditional" intention.
Surely, the plaintiff in Terry v. Munger did not receive the benefit
of such kindly consideration. In that case, the court did not concern
itself with whether or not the plaintiff actually intended to pass the
title to his property only in the event that he received compensation.
It was enough that plaintiff had selected a remedy, the logical and

legal effect of which was to pass title to the converted merchandise,
though, in fact, no such intention was in the plaintiff's mind. Indeed, whether he sued in contract or in tort, he would be relying on
the same facts and seeking the same relief. In either form of action,
he would have to prove conversion, or fail, and in either form of
action, he would receive a judgment for money damages. Waiver of
the underlying tort, in the factual sense, he never contemplated nor
even appreciated as possible. Yet, by his inadvertent choice of one
remedy, he barred himself from a more effective one, and would have
done so, even if he had not prosecuted the first to effect.
However complacent we may be at such a disposition of the rights
of litigants, we cannot remain so in jurisdictions where we have been
congratulated upon the projected miracles of procedural simplification, promised, if not accomplished, by the ambiguous oracle of the
Code of Civil Procedure and its successor, the Civil Practice Actthat "There is only one form of civil action.
From the rule of logic to the equitable rule of estoppel is indeed a
far cry. From an attitude of utter indifference to consequences,--to
solicitude that injustice shall not result, is praiseworthy indeed.
But, is it true? The Court of Appeals, in the Schenck case, did not
weed the garden. The authority of Terry v. Mungerwas not disturbed.
It was not even mentioned. The judicial process does not envelop the

entire area of infection; it proceeds case by case, marking its progress
by painful inclusion and exclusion, cautious that it does not unwittingly foreclose other litigants from their day in court, and leaving
to future litigants to ascertain whether what is said in a given case is
dictum to be abandoned, or decision for guidance.
'?Ibi., at 312.

I&N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act, | 8.
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Nor is the effect of these remarks lessened by later experience.
In Clark v. Kirby, 9 plaintiffs commenced an action for rescission
of a contract, by reason of alleged fraudulent representations on the
part of the defendants. One c efendent, Souders, was not served.
Thereafter, plaintiffs comment ed an action in Missouri against one
of the defendants in the New York action and one Corbin, who was
not a defendant in New York. "rhereafter, Souders was served in the
New York action. When Soud ers was served in New York, he alleged
that, by reason of the Missoiri proceedings, there had been an elec20
tion of remedies. The Appellate Division ordered plaintiffs to reply.
Plaintiffs replied that the Missouri action was not one for damages
for fraud; that the Missouri and New York actions were not inconsistent; that the Missouri action was unauthorized except as against
Corbin; that, according to the laws of Missouri, an action for rescission and for damages may be maintained at the same time; that the
Missouri action had been discontinued before trial. The Appellate
Division, in ordering the reply, had discussed the merits of Souders'
defense. It said tlhat though plaintiffs had disaffirmed the transaction in New York, yet, having sued in Missouri to recover damages,
they had made an irrevocable election to affirm the transaction. "If
he choose the latter remedy (rescission) he must act promptly,
'announce his purpose and adhere to it,' and not by acts of ownership
continue to assert right and title over the property as though it belonged to him.121 On the trial, the complaint was dismissed on the
pleadings. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment for these
reasons:

"(i) The New York action was an action for rescission. This
constituted the election of remedies, not the later action brought
in Missouri. (2) The reply served to the affirmative defenses
set up in the answer raised issues of fact as to waiver and an
abandonment which required a trial on the merits. (3) The
Missouri action was not as a matter of law a waiver or an
abandonment of rescission; neither was it inconsistent with the
claim of rescission. (4) Even if the action had been brought for
fraud against all the defendants and for damages, it was still
within the power of a court of equity to relieve the plaintiffs
Irom a mistake or error in procedure, especially after a
discontinuance of the Missouri action, and where there had never been
any act of ownership over the res since discovery of the fraud."22
N. Y. 295, 153 N. E. 79 (1926).
CIark v. Kirby, 204 App. Div. 447, 198 N. Y. Supp. 172 (ist Dept.

19243

20

1923).

21Quoting from Shappirio v. Goldberg, 192 U. S. 232, 242, 24 Sup. Ct. 259,
261 (1904).
nClark v. Kirby, supranote 19, at 304, 153 N. E. 82.
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These are radical, if not revolutionary, propositions. In a long line
of cases; theretofore, the courts of this state had not thus liberally
championed a plaintiff who "on points of practice and procedure"
had "been barred from trying this case on the merits," nor until the
decision of this case had impatience with a formalistic rule which had
outgrown its function and out-lived its purpose,--which was inconsistent with common sense, and abhorrent to fair play, and which
was certainly not in accord with the mores of the day-awakened the
court to the realization that "Such a result leads to the immediate
impression that something must be wrong in the application of our
rules of law."2' In the intervening period, nevertheless, the touch
of common sense, exhibiting as might be expected a lack of precise
logic, or of adequate authority, and in rebellious disregard of precedent, triumphed. The one doubt remaining is whether it represents

but a casual relapse from rigid formalities induced by judicial sentimentality in "a hard " case and to be erased in the recoil from the
explosion of an ancient doctrine by the "distinguishing" process, or
whether it is indeed a deliberate reformulation of the doctrine of
estoppel as applied to the principle of election of remedies. It is in
connection with this question that the reasons stated in the case of
Clark v. Kirby are illuminating. They seem to point to a new doctrine, eliminating that of election of remedies, in favor of a more
liberal though more uncertain rule of estoppel, based on the actual
instead of the presumed intention of the plaintiff. Such conclusion
seems justified, yet unassured, because, while most of the reasons
assigned by the court for its decision have support in precedent,
some of them are built on ancient and erroneous foundation. It is
difficult to be impressed with the proposition that the New York
action for rescission constituted an election of remedies. It is familiar
learning that the service of a complaint in an action at law constitutes
an irrevocable election, irrespective of what may be said as to the
real intention of the party. A contract having been thus affirmed
cannot thereafter be disaffirmed.25 In equity, however, the irrevocable security of disaffirmance is more lightly held. Vacillationwill
forfeit it. Intention to rescind must be firm, determined and unyieldnBank of Beloit v. Beale, 34 N. Y. 4 73 (1866); Haydock v. Coope, 53 N. Y. 68
(z873); Fowler v. Bowery Say. Bank, 113 N. Y. 450,21 N. E. 172 (1889); Conrow
v. Little, xi5 N. Y. 387, 22 N. E. 346 (1889); Terry v. Munger, Supra note 8.
uClark v. Kirby, supra note i9,at 298, x53 N. E. 8o.
Tery v. Munger, supra note 8. In re Garver, 76 N. Y. 386, 68 N. E. 667
(19o3); Clark v. Irby, supra note 20.
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hag. Intention is to be gathered2 from conduct, not from formulae
which thrive in disregard of fact.
Yet, as specifically applied to the doctrine of election of remedies,
there is authority that even an equitable rescission may be irrevocable; that ratification thereafter is impossible. So, in Moller v.
Tuska,27 plaintiff sued to regain possession of a quantity of sugar.
After the action had been commenced, plaintiff proved a claim in
bankruptcy as for goods sold (involving the same merchandise), and
received a dividend. Later, however, the claim was expunged and the
dividend returned. Though it was argued, on the trial, that plaintiff
had, by its subsequent conduct, affirmed the transaction, the court
held:
"The plaintiffs manifested their election by bringing this
action. After that, the otherway of redress wasnot open to them;
for, according to Comyn (Dig. Elect. c., 2), if a man once determines his election, it shall be determined forever. Hence they
could never successfully assert a claim against the purchaser
under the contract, for the election to disaffirm it had been
manifested, and to revoke it was not in their power. . . It
would seem to follow that the subsequent transaction with the
assgnee in bankruptcy could have no bearing upon the question,
first, because the plaintiffs were bound by their election... "8
It is, therefore, disquieting to find, in an opinion breathing so completely the liberalized air of equity procedure, a statement of doctrine so contrary to equitable principles, which require that, if the
plaintiff choose rescission, he must act promptly, "announce his
purpose and adhere to it."
Such a view gives to rescission, by action commenced, greater and
more decisive significance than disaffirmance by conduct or by any
other means.
The case of Clark v. Kirby contains within itself surprising evidence
of confusion of the logical with the estoppel theories of election of
remedies. After stating that it was the action for rescission which
"constituted the election of remedies, not the later action brought in
Missouri, "29 the court continued:
"The reply served to the affirmative defenses set up in the
answer raised issues of fact as to waiver and an abandonment
which required a trial on the merits."30
2

'Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U. S. 55 (1876); Shappirio v. Goldberg, supra note 20;
McNaught v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U. S., 136 App. Div. 774, 121
N. Y. Supp. 447 (2d Dept. I91O); Clark v. Kirby, supra note 20. Cf. Weigel
v. Cook, 237 N. Y. 136, 142 N.E. 444 (1923); Schenck v. State Line Telephone
Co., supra note 2.
27
28
Supra note 7b, at 168.
1bid.,
at 168-169.
29
3
Clark v. Kirby, supra note 19, at 304.
Supra note 19.
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But how could there be waiver or abandonment, under the theory of
Moller v. Tuska3' and of Clark v. Kirby, 31a both of which cases hold
that an equitable rescission constitutes an election of remedies,
unless, indeed, an election to disaffirm is revocable, whereas an election to affirm is irrevocable?
To assert, therefore, that an election in favor of an equitable
remedy is irrevocable, has a hollow ring. Such a thought is fundamentally inequitable. It would have been more satisfactory, if it
were not intended to establish a new rule, to have refused recognition
to the claimed effect of the Missouri proceedings as an election of
remedies because such proceedings were those of another state, as is
the rule with respect to other actions pending, 2 or because in Missouri
actions in affirmance and disaffirmance of contracts were not deemed
inconsistent." Again, the fact that there were differences in the
defendants in the two actions constitutes no meritorious distinction,
if previous precedents are to be regarded. 4 If the service of a com-plaint in the law action against even one of the defendants3 5 was
unauthorized, under the authorities it constituted an irrevocable
election. 6 Even the reason assigned, that the action in Missouri was
not inconsistent with the claim of rescission, because it asked for the
return of the purchase price plus moneys expended in developing the
property on the strength of the representations made, and not for
damages, though plausible and sufficient as a valid distinction, loses
force when it is borne in mind that many of the decisions upholding
unintentional election were made while such doctrine was certainly
37
not unknown.
Whether or not this technical distinction constitutes the basis of
the decision, and, therefore, minimizes the force of the more liberal
grounds of the decision, is further shrouded in doubt, because the
very same distinction was urged in a previous and recent case in the
same court, but received no favorable recognition," even though the
Appellate Division, in that case, ruled, as it did in Clark v. Kirby, that
"the answer and reply raise the point, without further necessity of
3
ISupra note 7b.
6,aSupra note x9.
nOneida County Bank v. Bonney, Ioi N. Y. 173, s. c.sueb. nom. Oneida County
Bank v. Herrenden, 4 N. E. 332 (1886).
53
34
This was alleged in the reply.
Terry v. Munger, supra note 8.
3
rThe opinion indicated that there was no claim that the Missouri proceeding
was unauthorized as against Corbin.
36Terry v. Munger, supra note 8.
37Mack v. Latta, 178 N. Y. 525, 71 N. R. 97 (1904).
38
Kline v. The Myriad Pictures Corporation, 211 App. Div. 550, 20 N.Y. Supp.
109 (1924), aff'd. without opinion, 240 N. Y. 667, 148 N. E. 75, (1924).
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proof, and the question must be determined upon the pleadings
alone."

39

The sufficiency of the distinction made in Clark v. Kirby between
rescission and affirmance at law rests on solid ground. It is predicated on the recognition of the fact that there may be rescission,
both at law and in equity. The action at law, for money had and

received, is based upon a completed rescission, whereas the remedy in
equity isfor a rescission. The one is executed; the other is executory.
The distinction is supported by Mack v. LattWO and by other authorities e4 in which it is pointed out that an action for a rescission can
hardly be said, in itself, to constitute a disaffirmance, because, until
and unless the court grants rescission, the contract is deemed to exist.
Of course, it is obvious that, whether or not an action of rescission is
deemed inconsistent with an affir ance of the contract, depends upon
w:hether we view its effect, in the present, or in the future, if, as and
when its purpose has been accomplished. The logical view regards
3

Ibid., at 55t.
"Supra note 37.
Houston Mercantile Company v. Powell & King 72 Misc. 358, 130 N. Y.
Supp. 274 (Sup. Ct. 1911); Cohoon v. Fisher, 146 Ind. 583 (z896). In Michigan,
joinder of causes of action for deceit and for rescission is permitted. In Glover v.
Radford, 120 Mich. 542, 544. 79 N. W. 803 (1899) the Court said:
"These are the most important questions in the case, and we think there is
error in both. There can be no doubt that the two theories are inconsistent in a
sense, because one is based on the continuation of the contract and the other upon
its rescission. The plaintiff attempted to rescind by tendering the stock and demanding the money that he paid for it. If there was fraud, he had the right to do
this, provided he had not waived it and could put the defendants in statu quo.
But he took the chance of being unable to convince the court and jury that he had
not waived his right to rescind, and, if he should fail in this, he could not recover
if he relied upon the single count, although the jury might find that he had been
defrauded. If there was fraud, and he did not succeed in rescinding the contract,
he certainly ought to have the right to recover damages for the injury he had
suffered, if any. Had defendants consented to rescission, and acted upon itthe
case would have been different, for there might then have been an estoppel;
but there is nothing in the nature of an estoppel here. We have frequently held
that one is bound by his choice between inconsistent rights or remedies, but,
where there is no estoppel, this cannot usually be, unless the person really had a
right of election. In this case, the plaintiff claimed that he had a right to rescind, and tried to rescind, but he did not succeed, either because he really hadno
such right or because he failed to seasonably assert it. He supposed that he had a
remedy growing out of rescission, but it turned out that he was mistaken, andthis
left him the right to recover for the fraud, if there was fraud. This subject was
discussed in McLaughin v. Austin, 1o4 Mich. 491; Chwddock v. Tabor, xx$ Mich.
33; Sullivan v. Ross' Estate, I3 Mich. 316. It is a common practice to permit
the joining of counts which state the cause of action differently, to prevent a
possi'le variance between the declaration and the proof. The plaintiff should
not have been required to elect between the counts of his declaration."
0

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
the purpose as accomplished. The estoppel view regards the ultimate effect, not the mere purpose.
In the Court of Appeals, the distinction seems to be partially
regarded, in that it recognizes that an action at law, on a completed
rescission, is consistent with an equitable action for a rescission,4yet is partially disregarded, in that it declines to acknowledge that
an equitable actionfor a rescission is consistent with an action at law,
in deceit, in affirmance 6f the contract.4 Accordingly, though now
paying homage to "estoppel," as the basis for election of remedies,
the Court of Appeals disowns the doctrine of those states (like
Indiana), in which the rule is based on estoppel and harks back to
the rule of logic of Terry v. Munger.
Yet, if it is illogical to join causes of action in deceit and for
rescission, it would seem just as illogical (and, to our mind, more
so) to permit an action for a rescission, when the plaintiff has already
rescinded the contract without the aid of the court. What has
been accomplished, does not need the aid of a court of equity to
effectuate.
Finally, the fourth reason assigned, that, assuming the Missouri
proceedings were for damages, equity could, nevertheless, relieve for
mistake, is indeed in the teeth of precedent and in utter contempt
of the formalistic doctrine of election of remedies. Once we abandon
the rule of logic and test by the measure of actual intention, there is
no longer a doctrine of election of remedies, but only the rule of
equitable estoppel. Such, it is to be hoped, will be the emergent
principle which no process of analysis or differentiation can obliterate.
Technical distinction and differentiation is possible, but the essence
of the decision is aptly put by Judge Crane, in the following words:
"All procedure is merely a methodical means whereby the court
reaches out to restore rights and remedy wrongs; it must never
become more important than the purpose which it seeks to accomplish. Unless some necessary requirement has been omitted,
a wrong move or mistake in the method of seeking relief from
the courts ought not to furnish protection for a wrongful act...
There should have been a hearing on the merits. The action in
Missouri, even f a slip or mistake, having been withdrawn,
cannot be seized by the defendants as a substitute for good faith
and honest dealing."
The utter hopelessness of the situation, in New York and elsewhere
(where the rule of estoppel is not consistently applied), is well illus42Clark v. Kirby, supra note i9, at 303,

153 N. E. 82.
Merry Realty Co. v. Shamokin & Hollis R. R. Co., supra note 6.
"Clark v. Kirby, supra note 42, at 303, 304.
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trated by a comparison of decisions like Kittredge v. Grannis45 and
47
Urdangv. Posner" in New York, and Cohoon v. Fisher,
in Indiana.
In the Kittredge case, plaintiff, on a first trial, proceeded in tort.
His judgment having been reversed, he proceeded on the new trial in
contract, waiving the tort. The result was that, whereas, previously,
it had been held that judgment could not be entered against a partner
49
who had not been served,4 8 now, since the action was in contract, it
could be. The court held that there had been no election of remedies,
because "The right of the plaintiffs to waive their cause of action in
tort and found their right to recover upon contract, whether express
or implied, is unquestionable, and there is no power either with the
defendant or in the court to compel them to proceed upon the tort."8 0
Yet, if this be so, (and the authority of this case, however desirable
the result, it must be conceded, has been impaired by its fate in the
Cotirt of Appeals), what becomes of the doctrine of Terry v. Munger?
Here there is no room for distinctions, based on the principles of
equitable jurisdiction. Here, as in Terry v. Munger, the election was
between legal remedies, one passing the title and the other retaining
the title, but here it was the second and subsequent action, instead of
the first and prior action, which waived the tort and operated to pass
the title. Here, then, we have waiver and abandonment in a law
action, by means of the operation of the fiction of waiver of tort, and
thus, in a law action, we have a type of election of remedies which is
not irrevocable. Furthermore, since the rights involved are not
contractual nor induced by fraud, this phenomenon of revocability
is not to be harmonized by any supposed discrimination between
cases involving title to property, and cases involving contractual
relations induced by fraud, and for which there is a concurrent
remedy in equity. Equitable principles do not apply and, therefore,
equity can offer no solution to satisfy the craving for a discrimination in logic. Nor is there any solace in the fact that the revocation
of the election was made by an amendment of the complaint. If the
mere service of the complaint constituted an irrevocable election, then
its amendment could not retroactively rob it of its inevitable legal
42I5 App. Div. 491, 214 N. Y. Supp. 25 (1926), rev'd on other grounds, utterly
unrelated to the subject of this discussion in244 N. Y. 182, 155 N. E. 93 (1926).
4622o App. Div. 6o9, 222 N. Y. Supp. 396 (Ist Dept. 1927), aff'd without
opinion in 247 N. Y. 565, 16I N. E. 184 (1928).
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4 2oo App. Div. 478, 193 N. Y. Supp. 84 (ist Dept. 1922).
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41Civ. Prac. Act, § 1197.
5OQuoting from People v. Wood, 121 N. Y. 522, 529, 24 N. E. 952, 953 (1890).
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consequence. The effect of the service of the pleading did not hang in
abeyance to be measured by subsequent events, which might never
occur.
51
a complaint pleading a cause of action for
In Urdang v. Posner,
money had and received, as on a completed rescission, by reason of
defendant's fraud, was amended on the trial, to state a cause of
action for fraud and deceit, thus eliminating the allegation of rescission. The amendment was allowed, and the judgment in favor of
plaintiff sustained by the Court of Appeals. It was said that plaintiff,
having disaffirmed, might affirm,-a sensible enough conclusion, but
contrary to the principle of Moller v. Tuska2 and to at least one of the
principles formulated in Clark v. Kirby.0 Here, again, the waiver of
the attitude of disaffirmance was recognized and enforced in a court
of law, without the aid of equitable principles, but, it is true, on the
theory that, in fact, plaintiff never did have a remedy based on
rescission. The court said:
"It is the respondent's contention that by commencing an
action upon the theory of rescission of the contract, the plaintiff had made an irrevocable election of remedies and could not
thereafter assert a cause of action upon a different theory. The defendantdid not claim surprise or prejudice at the trial when
the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint and there was
present no compelling reason for holding the plaintiff to an irrevocable election of remedies. The facts show that the plaintiff
had, after knowledge of the alleged fraud, continued to use the
violin. He, therefore, in effect had ratified the purchase, and
hence although he had suffered damage through a fraud he did
not have a cause of action for recisission. In drawing his complaint on the theory of rescission, therefore, he was pursuing a
mistaken and ineffectual remedy. Such a choice
does not con53
stitute an irrevocable election of remedies." a
The result is to be commended, but the reasoning process is not
that of Terry v. Munger nor that of Clark v. Kirby. Plaintiff did
rescind, but because, by his conduct, he could not succeed, his rescission must be deemed futile. The fact of rescission is confused with the
right to rescission and that right determined by subsequent conduct,
which waived it. The negation of the application of the doctrine, in
this case, denies the doctrine itself. If, where based upon the same
facts, inconsistent remedies are available, and the irrevocability of
the choice made is dependent upon effectiveness of the remedy chosen,
determined by a subsequent investigation of the evidentiary facts,
5

ISupra note 46.
6Supra note 42.

52Supra note 7b.
1S-upra note 46, at 611.
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then we have, indeed, passed on, though we refuse to admit it, from
election by logic to election by estoppel.
In Cohoon v. Fisher,54 it was held that an election to disaffirm,
evidenced by a suit for rescission in equity, was revocable, so that an
amendment of the complaint, which converted the action into one for
deceit at law, was proper. The court distinguished the cases holding
that an action at law constituted an irrevocable election, on the
ground that such an action constituted an affirmance of the contract.
This case, therefore, is in conflict with Clark v. Kirby,5 to the extent
that the Clark case holds (if it does) that an action of rescission constitutes an irrevocable election of remedies. We quote from the
Cohoon case, because it well illustrates the other point of view and
demonstrates the uncertainties of legal logic:
"In that case, like this, the action was brought to rescind a
contract for fraud; afterwards the complaint was so amended as to
make it a complaint to recover damages for the fraud. The answer
set up the original complaint as a conclusive election of remedies
in bar of the amended complaint. But it was held that such
election to be a bar must have been prosecuted to judgment.
A long list of adjudications is cited by counsel, decided in other
jurisdictions, apparently establishing a different rule. We are
asked to follow those cases without a word of explanation as to
how we are to escape the force of our own previous decision
above referred to...
But our case in 124 Ind.is supported on the point in question
by an extensive citation of decisions, both in this country and
England, and those decisions are directly in point. The facts in
the cases cited by appellee's counsel as supporting the contrary
rule, or at least so many of them as appear at all to be in point,
are just the reverse of the facts in this case or those in Nysewander v. Lowman. . .and cases therein cited. That is, in the
cases cited by appellee, the first suit was brought to recover
damages for the fraud perpetrated in the procurement of the
contract. After abandoning such suit another suit was brought
seeking a rescission of the same contract on account of the same
fraud. But in the case now before us, and the one decided in 124
Ind., the suit for rescission was brought first, which was abandoned in the amended complaint and instead a complaint for
damages on account of the same fraud was substituted.
It is true, in such a case, the injured party has a choice of either
of the two remedies mentioned, but it does not necessarily follow
that a mere choice of one by bare commencement of proceedings
under it, without prosecuting it to a conclusion, precludes a
resort to the other. Nor does it follow that because such preclusion does not arise in all cases that it may not arise in some
5Supra note 41.

55Supra note i9.
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cases. The facts of the cases to which appellee's counsel have
referred us, are either directly opposite to the facts in the case
now before us, or are of such a character as to make the rule laid
down in one of them applicable, the same as it is applicable to the
case now before us. That rule is stated in Nat. Bank of Illinois v.
First Nat. Bank of Emporia (57 Kan. 115, 45 Pac. 79).
and is stated thus:
'A man may not take contradictory positions, and where
he has the right to choose one of two methods of redress, and
the two are so inconsistent that the assertion of one involves
the negation or repudiation pf the other, his deliberate and
settled choice of one, with knowledge, or means of knowledge, of such facts as would authorize a resort to each, will
preclude him thereafter from going back and electing
again.'
Now how does the choice of the remedy of rescission involve
the negation or repudiation of the remedy of a suit for damages
for the fraud? No one will deny the right to abandon a suit for
rescission. [But see Moller v. Tuska,56 in New York.] Its abandonment involves the affirmation of the contract. Then if the
plaintiff may abandon it and thereby affirm the contract, that is
all he does when he sues for the damages caused by the fraud
in the procurement of the contract ...
It is thoroughly settled in this state, and everywhere
under our system of jurisprudence, that a suit for damages on
account of the fraud is a ratification or affirmation of the contract. [Put see Clark v. Kirby 7 in New Yorl.] . . .
Therefore, there is much reason in holding, as the cases cited by
appellee's counsel do, that an action begun to recover damages
resulting from the fraud in procuring the contract is so inconsistent with a subsequent action to rescind the contract for the
same fraud, that it cannot be maintained, even though the first
action was abandoned before judgment. When the contract is
affirmed and ratified by the injured party by such action, it then
becomes binding on him and is no longer voidable, and hence,
he cannot afterwards maintain a suit to rescind it. If the commencement of the suit for damages resulting from the fraud
amounts to a ratification and affin-mation of the contract, as we
have seen it does, then there is much reason for holding the
plaintiff precluded from the remedy of rescission without showing that the first suit was prosecuted to final judgment. Not so,
however, if the first suit is for rescission. Its comm6ncement is
nothing more than a bare choice of remedies. Its commencement and abandonment before final judgment are not inconsistent with the continued subsistence of the contract, or a subsequent suit affirming such contract. There may be cases in other
jurisdictions establishing a different rule, making the com5Italicised matter in brackets interpolated by us.
67Italicised matter in brackets interpolated by us.
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mencement of either suit first a conclusive choice of remedies
without prosecution to final judgment. But we are of the
opinion that the better rule is that established in this state, and
we adhere to it.
All we mean to hold as to the point now under consideration
is, that the cases cited by appellee are not necessarily inconsistent with the conclusions we have reached, and if they were our
own previous cases would and ought to control this case, supported as it is by both reason and authority." 8
In this setting, it is plain that a remedy for election of remedies is
sorely needed. It seems Utopian to expect decisive and wholesome
relief from the courts. This is said, not in criticism, but in recognition
of the "nature of the judicial process." The ship of the law must be
tied to ancient moorings. Changes in tide may deflect it somewhat,
but some fixation there must be, or its course will indeed by uncharted.
To revert to our previous metaphor, at the risk of literary error, the
task before us requires a ploughing of the soil, which will uproot the
weeds which have dug deep into it. That function is peculiarly that
of the legislature, and only from it, at this date, is it possible to expect
an immediate advance to a system in which procedural parasites do
not strangle the substantive rights of the parties.
The legislative enactment which will guarantee a sane view of the
fundamental rights involved in the doctrine of election of remedies
must be based on a recognition of the modern transformation of that
theory. It cannot ignore the practical utility of the means to accomplish the end, nor can it fail to maintain the auxiliary function of
practice rules to accomplish that end. A determination of the merits of
controversies, according to law, is the end in view. Procedure, properly administered, is always subordinate to that purpose. It never
becomes the goal in itself. Properly administered, it is the pathway
through the obstructions of controversy to the goal of decision; improperly administered, it is a barricade to progress and amicable
understanding, and the occasion for disrespect by those who encounter it. It will not do to fall back on so-called fundamental
principles, which in final analysis, are the rules of procedure heretofore obtaining, as do some who revel in the decorative order of the
Stone Age. Principles of practice must be translated into units of
utility according to modem standards, in order to be fairly tested.
Utility tests the very truth of the practice principle involved. It
created the principle and when the times require it, will destroy it
and set up a new one. The test lies, not in a priori assumption,
"Cohoon v. Fisher, supra note 41, at 586 ff.
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but in experience; not in fundamentals, but in practicability; not by
standards set in a period not at all comparable, but in the present
ever so much complicated by twentieth century social conditions.
We have passed on from the view that controversies may be dissected into constituent elements, each fitted into a form of action,
known as a remedy or cause of action. On the contrary, we now
realize that controversies remain the same in essence and in proof,
whether we label them, "at law" or "in equity," "on compleed
rescission" or 'for rescission," "in quasi-contract" or "in tort." The
fiction which made it possible that a right invaded should be forced
into a mould, so that the wrong might receive redress, has served its
purpose. Today, there must be redress for the wrong without
regard to the form of the remedy. The remedy no longer marks the
limits of justice. It is the right which dictates the ever expanding
limits of the remedy, whatever the form.
That being so, there is no reason for the continued existence of the
outworn doctrine of election of remedies. Not even the amelioration
induced by equitable principles satisfies the dictates of a modem
justice. That which equity can do, law should be able to accomplish.
Justice, according to law, should not be different from that according
to equity. The doctrine of election of remedies should be abolished,
except where it reaches the dignity of res adjudicataor of equitable
estoppel. These limitations are right, because a plaintiff who has
proceeded to judgment should be held bound, in subsequent actions
against the same parties, by the meritorious adjudication. He has
had his day in court, and the defendant is entitled to a respite from
litigation. But, short of res adjudicata and equitable estoppel, the
continuance of the rule can serve no purpose but to defeat rather
than promote justice.
Concretely put, the legislative enactment to accomplish this purpose, might read as suggested in the caption. The phrase "or by law
otherwise prevented" takes care of statutes of limitation and legislation in general. The special definition of "former adjudication" is to
assure regard for substance and not for form.

